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Abstract In this paper we present a differential game model of two firms with dif-
ferent technologies producing the same good and selling in the same world market.
The firm equipped with advanced technology is deciding whether to outsource parts
of its production to the home country of its competitor, where wages and the level of
technology are lower. Outsourcing reduces production costs but is associated with
spillovers to the foreign competitor. The degree to which the foreign competitor can
absorb these spillovers depends on its absorptive effort. Using numerical methods
the properties of a Markov Perfect Equilibrium of this game are characterized and
the implications of the variation of different key parameters are examined.
1 Introduction
Though most of the foreign direct investment (FDI) is still undertaken among the
developed countries, more and more FDI flows into newly developing ones. Among
the newly industrialized countries (NIC), the competition to FDI has increasingly
intensified, particularly after China joined the World Trade Organization (WTO).
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The overall picture of investment is that FDI flows into Asia more than to other de-
veloping countries in other regions, with the highest proportion of money flowing
into China compared to other developing economies. FDI inflow is highly appreci-
ated by the NIC, where the main reason are twofold: On the one side, the FDI can
generate income for local firms and workers; and on the other side, the spillover
effect is identified as very important for local firms and their development. Spillover
here is not only transfer of production technology, management skill, marketing and
ideas, but also the competitive pressure which may spur local firms to operate more
efficiently or take more advanced technology( see Kokko [15]). As stated by the
Global Economic Prospectus from the World Bank ([22], Page 3) “· · · The lack of
advanced technological competencies in these countries means that technological
progress in developing countries occurs through the adoption and adaptation of pre-
existing but new-to-the-market or new-to-the-firm technologies” and Chapter 3 of
this report identifies a number of important and policy-relevant trends and explores
some policy implications.
Although the empirical evidence concerning the existence of positive horizon-
tal spill-overs from FDI is mixed, there exists evidence that FDI is associated with
positive spill-overs, (see e.g. Go¨rg and Greenaway [11]). Indeed, recent empirical
studies find positive horizontal spillovers from FDI using firm level data from Hun-
gary (Halpern and Murakozy [13]), Romania (Smarzynska and Spatareanu [19]),
from 17 emerging market economies (Gorodnichenko et al. [12]). From Chinese
manufacturing firms, Liu [16] addresses both short-run negative productivity effects
and long-run positive effect of domestic firm due to FDI, and from Lithuania, Ja-
vorcik [9] produces evidence consistent with positive productivity spillovers from
FDI taking place through contacts between foreign affiliates and their local suppli-
ers in upstream sectors. Several channels of spill-overs have been discussed in the
literature, most prominently the demonstration effect, labor turnover (both inducing
horizontal spill-overs), and vertical linkages (see e.g. Saggi [18]), among others.
In order to generate positive technological transfers to local firms based on FDI,
the receiving country must have appropriate institutions in place and local firms
must be ready to adopt new technologies and to adapt their behavior. As has been
discussed extensively in the literature on ‘absorptive capacity’ (see e.g. Cohen and
Levinthal [1], local firms have to invest effort in order to build up their capacity to
digest information and knowledge that might spill over from more advanced firms
investing in their country and to generate productivity increases. The incentives to
invest such efforts are driven by the expectations of the firms with respect to fu-
ture spillovers they might receive and the economic implications of such incom-
ing spillovers. Hence, the determination of absorptive effort should be based on
intertemporal considerations of the local firms.
Similarly, the firms with advanced technology are aware that their activities in
foreign countries may yield a technological improvement of their foreign competi-
tors jeopardizing in the long-run their technological advantage.
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Taking the above two sides story into consideration, a differential game is pre-
sented in which a firm with advanced technology makes the decision of whether to
outsource parts of its production to a less developed economy where wages and the
level of technology are lower. A firm in the less advanced economy decides how
much effect to make to absorb the potential spillover. In our setting, the advanced
technology taken by the FDI is fixed and hence catching up in technology is pos-
sible, which comes from the idea also mentioned in the report of World Bank [22]
that “The level of technological achievement in developing countries has converged
with that of high-income countries over the past 15 years”.
Following some FDI literature, such as, Das[3]), Wang and Blomstrom [21],
Dawid et al [4], among others, we assume that the change in the host country’s pro-
ductivity is formulated as an increasing function of the presence of foreign capital
stock.
The consideration of the dynamic strategic interplay between FDI decisions and
the choice of investments in absorptive capacity gives rise to a differential game
with a two-dimensional state space and state dynamics characterized by interaction
terms of both states and a control. We are interested in characterizing a Markov-
perfect equilibrium (MPE) of this game. Closed form solutions for MPE strategies
are however available only for a small set class of differential game, most promi-
nently linear quadratic games. The game considered here does not fall in any of
these classes and therefore we rely on numerical methods to characterize MPEs,
the induced investment paths as well as their dependence on parameters and initial
conditions. In particular, we use collocation methods employing a Chebychev poly-
nomial basis to approximate a solution to the set of Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman equa-
tions characterizing the MPE. A similar technique has been used to study MPEs of
non-linear quadratic differentical games for exmaple in Vedenov and Miranda [20],
Doraszelski [6] and Dockner and Mosburger [5].2
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In the next section, we present the
model. In Section 3, we derive conditions characterizing a Markov-perfect equilib-
rium and describe our numerical approach. The results of our equilibrium analysis
are presented and discussed in Section 4 and Section 5 concludes.
2 The model
We consider a dynamic two-country model where country H (‘home country’) is a
developed industrialized country whereas country F (‘foreign country’) is a newly
industrializing country. For simplicity we consider only a singe firm in each country
2 See Judd [14] or Miranda and Fackler [17] for a more general treatment of collocation methods
for dynamic optimization and the survey of Jorgensen and Zaccour [10] for more information as to
using numerical methods to solve differential games.
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and we denote by Qi(t) the output of firm i at time t, i=H,F . The two firms compete
on a common market characterized by an inverse demand function P(QH +QF),
where at each point in time both firms simultaneously choose their output quantities.
Firms produce using labor as the only variable production input. Production ca-
pacities of a firm in a country are determined by its capital stock there. For simplicity
it is assumed that both firms have sufficiently large production capacities in the their
home country to be able to produce the desired output. However, the production of
firm H in country F is constrained by the size of the foreign capital stock firm H has
accumulated in that country. Output per input unit in the two countries is given by
AH(t) and AF(t) with AH(t)> AF(t). If a firm from country H produces in country
F , productivity reads AHF(t) where AF(0) < AHF(0) < AH(0). Since our focus is
on the effects of technological spill-overs generated by FDI on the evolution of the
technology gap between the two countries, we abstract from technological change in
the developed country and assume that AH and AHF are constant over time, whereas
AF(t) may change over time due to spill-over effects. In both countries labor is
supplied at wage rates wH and wF , where wH >> wF . It is assumed that wages
stay constant over time. In particular with respect to country F , where productivity
might increase over time due to spillovers, this assumption is debatable, however
the qualitative features of the model would not change if it would be assumed that
wages go up due to productivity increases as long as the wages change at a lower
rate than productivity such that the spill-overs induce a reduction in unit costs for
firms in country F . Assuming constant wages, substantially simplifies the analysis
compared to such a setting.
We assume that the firm in country H can reduce its unit production costs if it
produces in the foreign country, i.e.
wH
AH
>
wF
AHF
. (1)
In order to produce abroad, firm H has to invest to build up production capacities
in country F . We denote by I(t) ∈R foreign investment of firm H and by KF(t) the
capital stock of firm H in country F at time t. It should be noted that we also allow
for negative investment, and due to the spillover-effects described below disinvest-
ment might in principle be optimal for firm H. The capital accumulation equation is
given by
K˙F(t) = I(t)−δKF(t) (2)
where δ is the depreciation rate of capital and I ∈ R.
Foreign direct investments of country H firm in country F generates technological
spill-overs. Following Findlay[8], Wang and Blomstrom [21] and Dawid et al [4],
we posit that the change in technology level in the foreign country is given by
A˙F(t) = λ (t)KF(t)(AHF −AF(t)) . (3)
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The speed of absorption is determined by the absorption rate λ which is assumed to
be
λ (t) = a+bα(t),
with a ≥ 0, b ≥ 0 and α(t) ∈ R+ denotes the effort of Firm F in order to absorb
knowledge brought into country F by the FDI of firm H. Notice that we allow also
for the case, if a > 0, where spillovers are positive even if the absorptive effort of
firm F is α = 0. However, with effort of firm F , it will speed up the catching up
process. On the other hand, for a = 0, which we will consider as the default case,
there is no absorption of knowledge of firm F unless it invests positive effort.
In addition to investment (for firm H) and absorptive effort (for firm F), both
firms at each point in time also choose their output quantities. However, since the
output choices do not have any intertemporal implications, it is obvious that the
quantities are chosen according to Cournot equilibrium with marginal costs cH =
wH
AH
, cF(t) = wFAF (t) . It should be noted that using these marginal costs we assume
that firm H is not able to produce its entire output with its foreign capital stock
in country F . We have verified that this assumption holds in the equilibrium we
calculate in the next section.
In the following, we assume a linear inverse demand function given by
P(t) = P¯− (QH(t)+QF(t)) (4)
where P¯ > 0 is the reservation price. Then, the equilibrium outputs and profits in
the oligopoly market are given as follows3, where we write these expressions as
functions of the state AF(t):
Q∗H(AF) =
P−2 wHAH +
wF
AF
3
, Q∗F(AF) =
P−2 wFAF +
wH
AH
3
,
Π ∗H(KF ,AF) = (Q
∗
H(AF))
2+KF AHF
(
wH
AH
− wF
AHF
)
(5)
Π ∗F(AF) = (Q
∗
F(AF))
2. (6)
Inserting these expressions into the objective functions of both firms allows us
to consider only the intertemporally relevant controls I and α when formulating the
maximization problems of the firms.
Firm H’s objective then is to choose its investment strategy in order to maximize
its discounted payoff stream given by
3 See Dawid et al. [4] for detailed calculations.
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max
I(.)
JH =
∫ ∞
0
e−rt
[
Π ∗H(KF ,AF)− (βH I+ γH I2)
]
dt, (7)
where firm H’s market profit Π ∗H is given by (5)). Firm F’s problem is to choose its
effort strategy, α , to maximize its present value
max
α(.)
JF =
∫ ∞
0
e−rt
[
Π ∗F(AF)− (βFα+ γFα2)
]
dt, (8)
with market profit Π ∗F(AF) given by (6). The optimization problems are subject to
the state dynamics (2), (3) and the initial conditions
KF(0) = 0, AF(0) = AiniF ∈ (0,AHF).
3 Markov-Perfect Equilibria
Our analysis is based on the consideration of Markov-perfect equilibria of the game
described in the previous section. Given that both firms have infinite planing hori-
zons and time-autonomous instantaneous objective functions, we assume that firms
use stationary Markovian feedback strategies of the form I(KF ,AF) : X 7→ R (for
firm H) and α(KF ,AF) : X 7→ R+ (for firm F), where X = [0, K¯]× [A,AHF ] is the
considered state space with K¯ sufficiently large and A smaller than AiniF . A pair of
strategies (I∗,α∗) is a Markov-perfect equilibrium if for each firm its feedback strat-
egy induces a control path which solves the dynamic optimization problem (7) re-
spectively V F(KF ,AF) given that the opponent sticks to its equilibrium feedback
strategy. It is well known that Markov perfect equilibria are strongly time consistent
(see Dockner et al. [2])) and hence this is the standard concept for the characteri-
zation of the dynamic strategic interaction of firms which are not able to commit
ex-ante to certain control paths.
Due to the time autonomous nature of the objective and the infinite time horizon
also the value functions of both firms in a (stationary) MPE do not explicitly depend
on t and can be written as V H(KF ,AF) respectively V F(KF ,AF). The value functions
of firm h has to solve the following Hamilton-Jacob-Bellman (HJB) equation
rV H = maxI∈R
{[
ΠH(KF ,AF)− (βH I+ γH I2)
]
+
[
V HKF (I−δKF)+V HAF (a+bα∗(KF ,AHF))KF(AHF −AF)
]} (9)
where V HKF (V
H
AF ) represents the partial derivative of V
H with respect to KF(AF).
Since the right hand side of the above HJB equation is strictly concave with
respect to I, the first order condition is necessary and sufficient for maximization
problem, which gives
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I∗ =
V HKF −βH
2γH
. (10)
Similarly, the value function of firm F solves the HJB equation
rV F = maxα∈R+
{[
ΠF(AF)− (βFα+ γFα2)
]
+
[
V FKF (I
∗(KF ,AF)−δKF)+V FAF (a+bα)KF(AHF −AF)
]} (11)
and the optimal effort is
α∗ =
max[bV FAF KF(AHF −AF)−βF ,0]
2γF
. (12)
Substituting the optimal choice (10) and (12) into the HJB equations (9) and (11),
we obtain the two Bellman equation system
rV H −ΠH(AF ,KF)+
βH(V HKF −βH)
2γH
+
(V HKF −βH)2
4γH
−V HKF
(
V HKF −βH
2γH
−δKF
)
−V HAF
[
a+b
(
max[bV FAF KF(AHF −AF)−βF ,0]
2γF
)]
KF(AHF −AF) = 0
(13)
and
rV F −ΠF(AF ,KF)+
βF max[bV FAF KF(AHF −AF)−βF ,0]
2γF
+
max[bV FAF KF(AHF −AF)−βF ,0]2
4γF
−V FKF
(
V HKF −βH
2γH
−δKF
)
−V FAF
[
a+b
(
max[bV FAF KF(AHF −AF)−βF ,0]
2γF
)]
KF(AHF −AF) = 0.
(14)
Any pair of value functions satisfying (13), (14) and the transversality conditions
lim
t→∞e
−rtV H(K∗F(t),A
∗
F(t)) = limt→∞e
−rtV F(K∗F(t),A
∗
F(t)) = 0,
where (K∗F(t),A∗F(t)) denotes the state trajectory induced by the pair of value func-
tions corresponds to a Markov-perfect equilibrium of the game. Due to the non-
linear structure of the system of partial differential equations (13), (14) no closed
form solutions can be obtained. Therefore, we numerically determine a pair of value
functions that approximately solves (13), (14) on the state space X and calculate
approximations of the equilibrium feedback strategies using these value function
approximations. We briefly describe the procedure in the following subsection.
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3.1 Numerical Approach
We employ a collocation method using Chebychev polynomials to obtain the ap-
proximation of the value functions and the equilibrium feedback strategies. To this
end we generate a set of nK Chebychev nodesNKF in [0, K¯] and a set of nA Cheby-
chev nodes NAF in the interval [A,AHF ] (see e.g. Judd [14] for the definition of
Chebychev nodes and Chebychev polynomials) and define the set of interpolation
node in the state space X as
N = {(k f ,a f )|k f ∈NKF ,a f ∈NAF }.
Note that the cardinality of N is nK nA. In what follows we calculate polynomial
approximations of V H and V F which satisfy (13) and (14) on the set of interpola-
tion nodes N . It is well known that the choice of Chebychev interpolation nodes
avoids large oscillations of the interpolating polynomial between the interpolation
node (as could occur e.g. for equi-distant nodes) and implies that the interpolating
polynomials approximately solve the HJB equations on the entire state space.
The set of basis functions for the polynomial approximation is determined as
B = {B j,k, j = 1, ..,nK ,k = 1, ..,nA} with
B j,k(KF ,AF) = Tj−1
(
−1+ 2KF
K¯F
)
Tk−1
(
−1+ 2(AF −A)
(AHF −A)
)
,
where Tj(x) denotes the j-the Chebychev polynomial (see e.g. Judd [14] for the
definition of the Chebychev polynomial basis). Since Chebychev polynomials are
defined on [−1,1] the state variables have to be transformed in the way shown above.
The value function is approximated by
V i(KF ,AF)≈ Vˆ i(KF ,AF) =
nK
∑
j=1
nA
∑
k=1
Cij,kB j,k(KF ,AF), (KF ,AF) ∈ X , i = H,F, (15)
where C = {Cij,k} with j = 1, · · · ,nK ,k = 1, · · · ,nA, i = H,F is the set of 2nKnA
coefficients to be determined.
To determine these coefficients we set up a system of non-linear equations de-
rived from the condition that (Vˆ H ,Vˆ F) satisfies the HJB equations (13) and (14)
on the set of interpolation nodesN . This system consists of 2nKnA equations with
2nKnA unknowns (i.e. the coefficients Cij,k) and is solved by a recursive algorithm,
where based on an initial guess C˜0 = {Ci,0j,k, j = 1, ..,nK ,k = 1, ..,nA, i = H,F} of
the coefficients in iteration l ≥ 1 the coefficients C˜l−1 are used to calculate approx-
imations of the value functions and their partial derivatives at each node in N .
These approximations are inserted for all terms that occur in (13) and (14) where
the value functions or their derivatives appear in a non-linear form. Inserting the
approximation (15) with C replaced by C˜l for all terms in (13) and (14) where the
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value functions and their derivatives occur in a linear way, yields a linear system
of equations for the coefficients C˜l , which even for large values of 2nKnA can be
solved efficiently using standard methods as long as the coefficient matrix is well
conditioned. The solution of this linear system gives the new set of coefficient val-
ues C˜l . To complete the iteration the new approximations of the value functions and
their derivatives are inserted into all (including the non-linear) corresponding terms
in (13) and (14) and the resulting absolute value of the left hand side of these equa-
tions relative to the corresponding value function is determined for all nodes inN .
If the maximum of this relative error is below a given threshold ε the algorithm is
stopped, we set C = C˜l and the current approximation of the value functions is used
to calculate the feedback strategies of the players and the equilibrium dynamics.
Unfortunately, no general conditions can be given that guarantee the existence of
a stable fixed point of the described algorithm, which corresponds to an econom-
ically meaningful Markov-perfect equilibrium of the game. Also, starting with an
appropriate initial guess for the coefficients is often crucial for convergence to a
meaningful fixed point, even if there exists such a stable fixed point. To obtain the
numerical results discussed in the next section a continuation method was applied
by starting with a simplified problem without strategic interaction (a = b = 0) and
then increasing the variable b in small steps to arrive at the default parameter setting
with b= 0.2 (see below), where in each step the value function approximations from
the previous steps are used as the initial guess for the current step. Similar methods
were used to obtain results for the different parameter variations reported below.
For all numerical solutions reported it was checked that the state dynamics under
the equilibrium strategies does not leave X for any initial conditions in X , which
implies that the considered state space is sufficiently large to allow the correct cal-
culation of the value functions under the considered equilibria and also implies that
the transversality conditions are satisfied.
4 Results
The results presented below are based on the default parameter setting given in
Table 4 which to a large extend follows the values used in Dawid et al. [4]). These
values are not based on a serious empirical calibration of the model, but, by sticking
to the parametrization in Dawid et al. [4] allows us to highlight the implication
of the consideration of dynamic strategic interaction between the firms in the two
countries, which was not considered in that paper. The ratio of wages in the two
countries is four to one, and the monetary unit is normalized in a way that the wage
in country F is wF = 1. Unit costs of production for firm H in country F (wF/AHF =
0.5) are well below the unit costs at home (wH/AH = 1).
The upper bound for the foreign capital stock of firm H is set to K¯ = 0.6, which
under the considered cost parameters is sufficient to ensure that firm H never has
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incentives to build a stock larger than K¯. Also, by setting AHF = 2 and A = 1.5, we
restrict attention to the case where the initial productivity in country F is relatively
close to AHF , which in the absence of the consideration of absorptive effort choice
always leads to a convergence of productivity in country F to AHF . The robustness
of the qualitative findings reported below with respect to variations in this parameter
setting has been tested.
AH = 4 AHF = 2 wH = 4 wF = 1
βH = 0 γH = 250 βF = 0 γF = 0.03
δ = 0.06 r = 0.03 P¯ = 5
a = 0 b = 0.2
K¯ = 0.6 AF = 1.5 Kini = 0 AiniF = 1.55
nK = 8 nA = 8 ε = 0.003
Table 1 Standard parameter setting
Figure 1 shows the feedback strategies of the two firms in the MPE under the
default parameter setting. The qualitative features of these feedback strategies are
quite intuitive. The foreign investment of firm H becomes smaller the larger the
technological gap of firm F is because the lager the gap the larger the marginal
effect of an additional unit of foreign capital on the future increase in AF . This in-
crease reduces marginal costs of firm F , which negatively affects the future profits
of firm H. Furthermore, investments are an increasing function of the stock of for-
eign capital firm H has. The reason for this observation is similar to that just given
with respect to changes in AF . The larger foreign capital stock of firm H the faster
the productivity of firm F will catch-up and the smaller will be the technology gaps
in the future. Smaller future technology gaps imply that the negative future effects
of an additional unit of foreign capital for firm H are smaller and hence investments
of that firm increase. Absorptive effort of firm F is larger the larger the capital stock
KF is because the marginal effect of absorptive effort grows with KF . On the other
hand, the marginal effect of absorptive effort declines as AF comes closer to AHF
and therefore effort is a decreasing function of AF .
Figure 2 shows the dynamics of the state and control variables in the MPE for the
default parameter setting and an initial productivity of firm F of AF(0) = 1.55. It can
be clearly seen that under the default setting firm H builds up a positive capital stock
in country F and keeps a positive stock in the long run. Firm F chooses positive
absorption effort throughout the run and is therefore able to completely close the
gap between its own productivity AF and the productivity AHF of the high-tech firm
H when producing in country F . The amount of effort invested in absorption is non-
monotone with a steep initial increase in effort and a long phase of decreasing effort
after an early peak at approximately t = 15. The intuition for the non-monotone
dynamics of the absorptive effort is that the marginal effect of an increase of KF on
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FKFA
∗I
  
FK
FA
∗α
(a) (b)
Fig. 1 Equilibrium strategies of firms H (a) and firm F (b) for the default parameter setting.
the incentives to invest in absorptive effort is large in the initial periods when the
technological gap is still large. The fast catch-up of AF towards AHF reduces the
marginal future value of an investment in absorptive effort and therefore reduces the
incentives for firm F to choose a high α . This effect starts to dominate after t = 15
inducing a steady decline in α . However, the absorptive effort always stays positive
because under the default parameter setting marginal costs of effort converge to zero
as α becomes small. As we will see below the property that marginal costs of effort
are zero for α = 0 is the crucial property that induces a full catch-up steady state.
In order to understand the implications of a relaxation of the assumption that
marginal costs of effort are zero at α = 0 we now consider the effects of an increase
of the parameter βF . For positive βF marginal costs of effort are strictly positive on
the entire control space R+. In Figure 3 we show the feedback functions in the MPE
for βF = 0.2. Setting βF to that positive value induces that α = 0 on a substantial
part of the state space. In particular, for small foreign capital stocks of firm H and
for a small technological gap, the marginal (present and future) returns of absorptive
effort are not sufficient to outweigh the marginal costs and therefore firm F does not
invest any effort to absorb the potential spillovers from firm H. In equilibrium firm
H takes this behavior of its opponent into account and therefore reduces investment
in the areas of the state space close to the line where firm F starts to invest positive
effort. In the interior of the region where firm F invests positive effort the same
logic as in the case of βF = 0 implies that investment of firm H is an increasing
function of KF and this gives rise to the rather complex and non-monotone shape of
the feedback function of firm H.
The implications of these changes in the feedback strategies on the equilibrium
dynamics of states and controls can be seen in Figure 4. First, considering the dy-
namics of KF and AF we observe that no full catch-up of the productivity of firm
F emerges although firm H keeps a positive foreign capital stock in the long-run.
Hence, contrary to the case with exogenous absorptive capacity studied in Dawid
et al. [4] with endogenous absorptive capacity a steady state exists where the high
tech firm H can keep some productivity advantage relative to its local competitor
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Fig. 2 Equilibrium dynamics under the default parameter setting: (a) foreign capital stock of firm
H, (b) productivity of firm F , (c) investment of firm H, (d) absorptive effort of firm F .
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FA
∗I
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FA
∗α
(a) (b)
Fig. 3 Equilibrium feedback strategies of firms H (a) and firm F (b) for βF = 0.2.
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in country F although it keeps exploiting the wage advantage in country F with
a positive long run stock of foreign capital. Whereas the steady state level of the
productivity of firm F is a strictly decreasing function of βF the dependence of the
size of the long run foreign capital stock of firm H from βF is non-monotonous,
where this level is approximately identical for βF = 0 and βF = 0.2, but substan-
tially smaller for βF = 0.1. In the initial part of the dynamics a larger value of the
absorptive cost parameter βF induces a smaller foreign capital stock of firm H. This
might seem counter-intuitive, but can be well explained by considering the dynam-
ics of the controls of the two firms.
50 100 150 200 250
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4 F
K
t 50 100 150 200 250
1.6
1.7
1.8
1.9
2.0
HFA
FA
t
(a) (b)
0 50 100 150 200 250
0.015
0.020
0.025
0.030
∗I
t 50 100 150 200 250
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1.0
1.2
1.4
∗α
t
(c) (d)
Fig. 4 Equilibrium dynamics for βF = 0 (blue line), βF = 0.1 (green line) and βF = 0.2 (red
line): (a) foreign capital stock of firm H, (b) productivity of firm F , (c) investment of firm H, (d)
absorptive effort of firm F .
For positive βF in the initial periods the stock of foreign capital is so small that
firm F does not invest any absorptive effort and hence the technological gap remains
unchanged. Firm H however foresees that due to the increase in KF eventually the
point in time will be reached where firm F starts investing absorptive effort and
the productivity of firm F starts to increase. As this point in time comes closer the
implicit (discounted future) costs associated with an additional unit of capital in
country F becomes larger and therefore investment of firm H decreases in the initial
periods. The time interval on which investment is decreasing is longer the larger
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absorption costs βF are and this explains why an increase of absorption costs has a
negative impact on the size of the foreign capital stock in the initial periods. Once
firm F starts choosing positive α the technological gap shrinks and this reduces the
costs for firm H of an additional unit of foreign capital due to future technological
catch-up. Once this effect becomes dominant firm H starts to increase its invest-
ment and firm F reduces its absorptive effort until a steady state is reached where
absorptive effort is again zero. It should be noted that this steady state is located ex-
actly at the line in the state-space where the equilibrium feedback function of firm
F switches from zero to positive α .
We now consider the effect of an increase of the wage in country F on the dy-
namic of FDI and of the technological catch-up. Clearly, the lower labor costs in
country F are the main motivation for firm H to move parts of the production of
country F and it is therefore important to understand how the economic dynamics
is influenced by the amount of the wage disparity. As discussed above we assume
that wages stay constant over time, for example due to institutional inertia.
In order to examine the effects of an increase in wF , we first consider the di-
rect effect of such a parameter change on the equilibrium feedback functions of
both firms. We carry out this analysis for a positive value of βF = 0.2 where
in general no full technological catch-up of firm F occurs. In Figure 5 we de-
pict the change in the feedback functions as the wage in country F increases
by 10%, i.e. we depict ∆ I∗(KF ,AF) = I∗(K f ,AF ;w f = 1.1)− I∗(K f ,AF ;w f = 1)
and ∆α∗(KF ,AF) = α∗(K f ,AF ;w f = 1.1)−α∗(K f ,AF ;w f = 1). The figure clearly
shows that a wage increase in country F induces a downward shift of the foreign
investment function of firm H and an upward shift of the feedback function deter-
mining the absorptive effort of firm F , thereby enlarging the area in the state space
where firm F chooses positive effort. There is a clear intuition for these shifts. An
increase of wF induces higher unit costs of labor for firm F , which increases its
incentives to increase labor productivity and this leads to higher absorptive effort
of that firm. This increase in absorptive effort reduces the incentives for firm H to
invest in country F . Furthermore, the increased wage costs in country F reduces the
cost savings of firm H from production in country F , which also negatively affects
its incentives for foreign investment.
The effects of these changes in the feedback functions on the equilibrium dynam-
ics of states and controls can be seen in Figure 6. As expected, foreign investment
the size of the foreign capital stock of firm H becomes smaller throughout the run
and in the steady state if the wage wF goes up. More surprisingly, the increase in
wages in country F induces a decrease in the productivity of firm F throughout the
run and in the steady state. This effect is particularly strong in the initial phase of
the dynamics, where first the delay till the catch-up of firm F starts becomes larger
for increasing wF and then the speed of the catch-up is substantially smaller under
a larger value wF . Hence, although the incentives for firm F to improve its labor
productivity become stronger if the local wage goes up, in equilibrium the induced
slowdown in the foreign investment is so strong that the actual productivity trajec-
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Fig. 5 Difference in the equilibrium strategies of firms H (a) and firm F (b) between the cases
wF = 1.1 and wF = 1.
tory is shifted downwards. In the initial periods the reduction in foreign capital stock
due to a wage increase implies even a reduction of absorptive effort of firm F .
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Fig. 6 Equilibrium dynamics for wF = 1 (blue line), wF = 1.1 (green line) and wF = 1.2 (red
line): (a) foreign capital stock of firm H, (b) productivity of firm F , (c) investment of firm H, (d)
absorptive effort of firm F .
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Based on these considerations, it is straight forward to see that the profits of firm
F are negatively affected by an increase of the local wage wF . Numerical results not
shown here confirm that an increase in wF induces a downward shift of the value
function of firm F and also a downward shift of the trajectory of instantaneous
profits of that firm, which means that an increase of wF (for given initial conditions)
implies not only lower productivity but also a reduction of profits of the firm at each
point in time. Furthermore, numerical evidence shows that the total wage income of
workers in country F is positively affected by an increase of wF , but that this effect
is smaller than the induced loss of firm profits, such that total income in country F ,
consisting of the sum of firm profits and wage income, is negatively affected by the
increase in wF .
HF∆
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Fig. 7 Effects of changes in wF on the profit of firm H. (a) Difference in the instantaneous profits
of firms H between the cases wF = 1.1 and wF = 1; (b) value function of firm H for the default
initial conditions and an increasing value of wF .
The effect of an increase in the wage in country F on the profit of firm H is less
clear. On the one hand, such a wage increase makes the production of firm H in
country F more expensive. Also, as discussed above, the wage increase leads to an
upward shift of the absorptive effort of firm F . Both of these effects have negative
implications for the profits of firm H. On the other hand, the wage increase induces
higher marginal costs for the opponent firm F , which makes it a weaker competitor
and induces an upward shift of the price. This increases the profit of firm H. As can
be seen in panel (a) of Figure 7 the interplay of these effects with the adjustment
of the optimal strategy of firm H is such that an increase in wF initially leads to
a higher profit of firm H but induces a decrease in the long run profit. The main
mechanism for these dynamic implications seems to be the induced reduction of in-
vestments of firm H we discussed above. This reduction of investments which, does
not only reduce investment costs but also leads to a substantial slowdown of initial
technological catch-up of firm F , has particularly strong positive profit implication
for firm H in the initial periods, whereas the negative implications of an increase of
wF grow over time as firm H accumulates more foreign capital. Also, in the long
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run the increase in the technological gap AHF −AF induced by the wage increase
is much smaller than in the initial periods. However, as can be seen from panel (b)
where the value function of firm H is depicted for increasing values of wH , the initial
positive effect outweighs the negative long-run implications of the wage increase,
such that the discounted payoff stream of firm H in equilibrium increases with wH .
Having examined the implications of a wage increase in country F , we conclude
our analysis by briefly considering a scenario where even without any absorptive
effort of firm F this firm receives technological spillovers as long as firm H has a
positive capital stock in country F . With respect to our parametrization this means
that we consider the implications of an increase of the parameter a to some posi-
tive value. Figure 8 show the equilibrium dynamics of states and controls for a = 0,
a= 0.1 and a= 0.2. Whereas the difference in the dynamics between the cases with
positive values of a is very minor, there is a substantial difference between these
two cases and our default setting where a = 0. For positive values of a, firm F al-
ways achieves a complete technological catch-up to AF = AHF . However absorptive
effort of the firm is reduced to zero such that the catch-up is due to the ‘automatic
spillovers’ generated by the positive capital stock of firm H. Firm H could prevent
such spillovers only by reducing its foreign capital stock to zero, but, as can be
seen in panels (a) and (c) of the figure, the increase of the spillover intensity in-
duces higher foreign investment of firm H and also a larger foreign capital stock
for almost the entire time interval. Intuitively, there are two reasons for this. First,
the faster catch-up of AF towards AHF reduces the marginal effect of an additional
unit of foreign capital on the future dynamics of AF , and, second, since absorptive
effort is constant zero for positive values of a, the strategic effect that an increase
in the foreign capital stock of firm H induces higher absorptive effort by firm F is
not present for positive values of a and this increases the incentives of the firm for
foreign investment.
5 Conclusions
In this paper, we have considered the dynamic strategic interaction between two
competing firms located in a high- respectively low-tech country. The firm in the
high-tech country can reduce production costs by moving parts of its production
to the low-tech country, but by doing so risks to generate technological spillovers
which allow its competitor to reduce the technological gap between the two firms
in terms of productivity. Taking into account the literature on absorptive capacity
we assume that the intensity of the spillovers does not only depend on the size of
the foreign capital stock of the high-tech firm and the size of the technological gap,
but also on the amount of effort invested by the firm in the low-tech country to
absorb the spillovers. The differential game, which captures the strategic interaction
between the two firms, is of highly non-linear structure and does not fall into any of
the classes of games where analytical treatments of Markov Perfect Equilibria are
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Fig. 8 Equilibrium dynamics for a = 0 (blue line), a = 0.1 (green line) and a = 0.2 (red line): (a)
foreign capital stock of firm H, (b) productivity of firm F , (c) investment of firm H, (d) absorptive
effort of firm F .
feasible. Therefore numerical methods of collocation type were used to examine the
characteristics of the Markov Perfect Equilibria of the game.
Several noteworthy findings result from this numerical analysis. First, it is
demonstrated that under weak assumptions on the cost function of effort equilibrium
behavior leads to a steady state where the high-tech firm keeps a positive capital
stock in the low tech country, but the productivity of the firm located in that country
still does not catch-up to the productivity of the high-tech firm. Such a steady state
is ruled out in the treatment of Dawid et al. [4], where the absorptive capacity of the
local firm was assumed to be exogenously given. Second, the analysis highlights
several interesting implications of changes in the key parameters on the equilibrium
dynamics. In particular, it is shown an increase of the costs of absorptive effort of
the low-tech firm leads to a reduction of the foreign investment of the high-tech
firm in the initial part of the dynamics. An increase of the wage rate in the low-tech
country induces a slower catch-up of the productivity of the firm in that country and
less foreign investment of the high-tech firm. Finally, an increase of the base value
(with zero effort) of the absorptive capacity of the low-tech firm to a positive value
induces more foreign investment. Overall, this analysis demonstrates that even in
games with more than one state and highly non-linear state dynamics the applica-
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tion of numerical collocation methods allows to obtain a clear and comprehensive
picture of the qualitative properties of Markov Perfect Equilibria of the game.
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